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Abstract
Five experiments examined whether changes in the pace of external events influence people’s judgments of duration. In
Experiments 1a–1c, participants heard pieces of music whose tempo accelerated, decelerated, or remained constant. In
Experiment 2, participants completed a visuo-motor task in which the rate of stimulus presentation accelerated,
decelerated, or remained constant. In Experiment 3, participants completed a reading task in which facts appeared on-
screen at accelerating, decelerating, or constant rates. In all experiments, the physical duration of the to-be-judged interval
was the same across conditions. We found no significant effects of temporal structure on duration judgments in any of the
experiments, either when participants knew that a time estimate would be required (prospective judgments) or when they
did not (retrospective judgments). These results provide a starting point for the investigation of how temporal structure
affects one-off judgments of duration like those typically made in natural settings.
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Introduction
The rate or speed of external events influences people’s
estimates of duration. In particular, intervals that are filled with
more events or faster-moving objects are usually judged longer
than those with fewer events or slower speeds [1–5]. However,
relatively few studies have asked how changes in the pace of external
events influence our judgment of time. In an early study, Buffardi
[6] found that clustering events near the beginning of an interval
led to longer subjective duration than clustering them near the end
(see also [7,8]). More recently, Matthews [9] found that shapes
moving with constant speed were judged longer than those which
decelerate, which in turn seemed longer than those which
accelerate. Similarly, a recent series of studies using brief tone
sequences found that evenly-spaced sequences were judged longer
than those with a change in tempo [10]. Moreover, temporal
structure interacted with physical duration: accelerating sequences
were judged longer than decelerating ones at short durations but
the pattern reversed at longer durations.
These studies suggest that changes in tempo affect judgments of
duration, but all were conducted in the psychophysical tradition:
the stimuli were meaningless, lasted at most a few seconds, and
participants judged many items over the course of the experiment.
There is increasing emphasis on duration estimates produced
under more ecologically valid circumstances (e.g., [11–13]). The
current work examines the effects of temporal structure on
duration estimates under more natural conditions, where partic-
ipants made one-off judgments of intervals lasting a few minutes.
That is, each participant judged a single time interval defined by a
meaningful event sequence. Understanding such judgments is
practically important because they more closely resemble the time
estimates made in everyday life (people rarely judge the durations
of hundreds of tones one after the other but are often asked how
long a single experience or task lasted). Moreover, one-off
judgments of long intervals may well be made different from
psychophysical judgments because (a) judgment of intervals longer
than about 1 second are often argued to rely on cognitive and
neural mechanisms which are different from those subserving
judgment of shorter intervals (see [14] for a review), and (b)
psychophysical tasks elicit comparisons between stimuli presented
in the experimental session, which can exert profound context
effects on temporal estimates [10,15–17], whereas one-off judg-
ments minimize such effects.
For some participants in our experiments, duration estimates
were retrospective (participants did not know that they would be
asked for a duration judgment). For others, the judgments were
prospective (participants were forewarned that they would be asked
for a duration judgment). Previous research suggests that these two
types of judgment draw upon different mechanisms and are
differentially affected by experimental manipulations (e.g., [18]).
Experiments 1a–1c had participants judge pieces of music whose
physical duration was always the same but whose tempo either
gradually increased (accelerating condition), gradually decreased
(decelerating condition), or remained steady (constant-rate condi-
tion). Experiment 2 used a visuo-motor task in which participants
responded to left and right arrows which appeared at increasing,
constant, or decreasing rates, with total duration and number of
stimuli held constant. Experiment 3 used a reading task in which
participants read ‘‘fun facts’’ which appeared at increasing,
decreasing, or constant rates, with the total duration and number
of items equated across conditions. Competing theories of
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temporal judgment make different predictions about the effects of
temporal structure in these studies.
One class of theory emphasises memory processes and is
particularly relevant to retrospective judgments. In particular, it
has been argued that remembered duration is positively related to
the ‘‘storage size’’ [19], degree of segmentation [20,21] or number
of contextual changes [22] during the interval. Within these
frameworks, accelerating, decelerating, and constant-rate stimuli
might be expected to have the same remembered duration because
they comprise the same number of events. On the other hand,
changes in tempo are presumably an integral part of the overall
‘‘stimulus complexity’’ and may necessitate changes in processing
style over the course of the interval, in which case accelerating and
decelerating items will be judged longer than constant-rate stimuli.
An alternative memory-based perspective comes from Boltz
[23,24], who has suggested that highly coherent stimuli (where
the temporal and non-temporal structure affords high predictabil-
ity) are more successfully encoded into memory, yielding more
accurate duration estimates. One plausible idea is that gradual
changes in tempo will reduce coherence by making the
hierarchical structure of the event sequence less apparent, thereby
reducing accuracy for the accelerating and decelerating items.
A second class of theory concerns "active timing". When people
know that a temporal judgment will be required (in a prospective
judgment task), they can employ intentional timing strategies
during stimulus presentation. Many theorists assume that inten-
tional timing is based on some kind of counting or accumulation
process, often involving the flow of pulses from a pacemaker [25–
30]. If the pacemaker keeps a steady rate then temporal judgment
will be unaffected by temporal structure (assuming that other
aspects of the process – such as the latency to begin/end the
accumulation of pulses – are also unaffected). However, several
authors have argued that the pacemaker is not constant but is
affected by factors such as stimulus modality and intensity (e.g.,
[31–33]). In particular, presenting a stream of clicks at 5 Hz for a
few seconds seems to speed up the pacemaker, lengthening the
subjective duration of a subsequent stimulus [32–34] (see also
[35]). This implies that the pacemaker rate is coupled to the tempo
of external stimulation. If so, the nature of this coupling will
determine the effect of temporal structure on judged duration. A
linear coupling predicts no effect because the average tempo is the
same for accelerating, decelerating, and constant rate conditions.
However, some authors have suggested a negatively-accelerated
(e.g., logarithmic) relationship between pacemaker rate and the
pace of stimulus change [9,10,36]. Under this view, judged
duration will be maximal for stimuli with constant rate [4].
Beckman and Young [1] have suggested an alternative, change-
based model in which stimulus change combines additively with
physical duration (a proxy for degree of environmental change) to
determine subjective time. A simple view equates change with
number of events or distance travelled, in which case accelerating,
decelerating, and constant-rate stimuli which are matched on
these dimensions will appear to have equal duration. If second-
order change is also taken into account, then accelerating and
decelerating sequences will be judged longer than constant-tempo
ones. Other authors have emphasized the role of attention in
active timing (e.g., [37–39]), although the predicted effects of
changes in tempo under these accounts are unclear. Finally,
although memory-based and active-timing accounts are most
obviously applicable to retrospective and prospective judgment
tasks respectively, it is worth noting that participants might
nonetheless use memory-based strategies for prospective judg-
ments and rely on incidental pacemaker-based timing for
retrospective judgment.
The five experiments described here examine the effects of
temporal structure on one-off judgments of duration using both
prospective and retrospective judgment tasks, and aim to constrain
the theoretical accounts outlined above.
Experiment 1a
Experiment 1a had participants listen to a piece of music whose
tempo either accelerated, decelerated, or remained constant, and
then make an unexpected judgment of the music’s duration.
Method
All Experiments were approved by the Faculty Ethics Commit-
tee for the University of Essex Faculty of Science and Engineering.
Experiments 2 and 3 obtained written consent. For Experiments
1a–1c, consent was oral, in keeping with the British Psychological
Society Code of Human Research Ethics and approved by the
University of Essex Faculty of Science and Engineering ethics
committee. Oral consent was appropriate because participation
took place in diverse public settings, was anonymous, and
comprised a task (listening to a brief piece of piano music and
judging how long it lasted) that posed no conceivable risk to the
participants, who were free to withdraw at any time. No
participants withdrew after starting the task, and participants’
written responses to the study questions was used to document
their consent.
Participants. An opportunity sample of 135 participants (65
females) aged 19–68 years (M=32.5 years, SD=11.7 years) were
recruited from a variety of locations (e.g., on campus, in their
workplace).
Stimuli. The stimuli were three pieces of piano music:
Inventio 4 by Johann Sebastian Bach (in 3/8); an excerpt from
Sarabande by Georg Friedrich Ha¨ndel (in 3/2); and an excerpt
from Sonata Facile by Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (in 4/4). The
pieces were chosen to be unfamiliar to the majority of the
participants and were edited in Musescore (www.musescore.org), a
freely-available piece of music-composition software. Musecore
has an integrated sequencer and synthesizer which plays musical
scores and allows the resulting performances to be saved as midi
files. Pause and repeat signs were removed, and tempos of 78, 96,
and 112 beats per minutes were chosen for the Bach, Ha¨ndel, and
Mozart pieces, respectively. Using a synthesizer to generate the
pieces has the advantage of avoiding slight changes in tempo/
pauses etc that come during human performance.
We used Audacity’s ‘‘Silence finder’’ (audacity.sourceforge.net)
to apply a uniform criterion for removing silence from the end of
the recordings (specifically, silence was defined as intensity less
than 250 dB lasting more than 0.1 seconds). We then used
Audacity’s ‘‘Sliding time scale/pitch shift’’ tool to adjust the tempo
without altering the pitch. To create the ‘‘accelerating’’ stimuli, we
set the starting tempo at 20% below the original value and the
final tempo at 20% above the original value. For the ‘‘deceler-
ating’’ stimuli, the starting and final tempos were set at 20% above
and below the original value, respectively. These values were
selected so that the changes in tempo were gradual but the initial
and terminal tempos were very noticeably different.
The accelerating and decelerating versions of each piece had
identical durations, but differed by a few hundred milliseconds
from the original, constant-tempo pieces (an artefact of the tempo
adjustment procedure). We therefore used the sliding time scale
tool to apply a very small constant shift to the constant-pace
stimuli so that they had the same durations as the corresponding
accelerating and decelerating pieces. An advantage of this
approach is that all three versions of each piece of music
Judgments of Duration
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(accelerating, decelerating, constant-tempo) had been subject to
the sliding time scale algorithm.
These manipulations resulted in constant-tempo, accelerating,
and decelerating versions of all three pieces (Bach, Ha¨ndel,
Mozart). The constant-tempo, accelerating, and decelerating
versions of each piece had the same duration, and the pieces
were extremely similar in length: (Bach= 61.07 seconds; Ha¨n-
del = 61.05 seconds; Mozart = 61.03 seconds). Finally, we used the
Scale Intensity function of Praat (www.fon.hum.uva.nl/praat/) to
norm the average nominal intensities to 65 dB. (Even before
norming, the nominal intensities were very similar for all pieces:
60.3–61.7 dB). All of the final stimuli were saved as stereo wav files
and are available from the authors.
Design and procedure. Participants were recruited in a
variety of settings. They read an information sheet telling them
that the experiment involved listening to a piece of music and that
it should take no more than 5 minutes of their time. They were
asked to listen carefully to the piece of music over headphones and
told that, once it finished, they should remove the headphones,
whereupon they would be given a question sheet. Participants
were not told in advance that a duration judgment would be
required. The music was played from a portable music player over
Sennheiser HD 580 headphones. The testing environments
typically involved low-level background noise.
Each of the 9 composer6condition combinations was played to
15 different participants. The first question on the response sheet
asked: ‘‘How long do you think that the piece of music lasted? Go
with your intuitive judgment - do not try to use a watch or clock.’’
There followed space to enter a judgment in minutes and seconds.
The next question asked participants to put a small mark on a
horizontal line ‘‘to indicate how long the piece of music felt to
you’’, in order to probe their subjective impressions (which can be
affected by event structure in a way not always detectable with
absolute duration estimates [40]). The line was 14 cm long and
labelled ‘‘Very short’’ and ‘‘Very long’’ at the ends. (For the first
20 participants, a formatting error meant that the labelling was
slightly ambiguous. However, the experimenter was available to
provide verbal clarification, and exclusion of these participants
made no difference to the results.) The distance of the participant’s
mark from the ‘‘Very short’’ end of the line was measured and
divided by the total line length to get a response scaled between 0
and 1.
Participants were also asked to rate their enjoyment of the piece
from 1 to 7 (where 1= not at all and 7= very much), to indicate
whether they recognized the music and, if they did, to try to name
the piece. Finally, they indicated their age and gender.
Results and Discussion
Alpha was set to.05 for all analyses.
Recognition. Preliminary analysis showed that 25 partici-
pants (18.5%) purported to recognize the piece they were played,
distributed fairly evenly over the decelerating (N=12), accelerating
(N= 8) and constant-tempo (N= 5) conditions, x2(2,
N=135) = 3.63, p= .16, and between the pieces by Bach (N= 9),
Ha¨ndel (N= 4), and Mozart (N= 12), x2(2, N=135) = 4.81,
p= .090. Of the people who said they recognized the music, 7
attempted to identify it, mostly by venturing a composer; no-one
named the piece correctly but 5 either correctly named the
composer or named another piece by the right composer. Thus, it
seems that the pieces met the aim of being largely unrecognized,
and recognition was unrelated to either composer or temporal
structure.
Temporal judgments. Here and below, preliminary ANO-
VAs were conducted which included composer and recognition as
between-subject variables. With one exception (noted below), none
of the main effects or interactions involving these factors was
significant and they were dropped from the analysis. (Their
inclusion made no difference to the effects of temporal structure).
Responses to the duration estimation question were converted
into seconds and are shown in Table 1. The judgments from the
decelerating, accelerating, and constant-tempo conditions did not
significantly differ, F(2,132) = .71, p= .492, g2p = .01. The duration
estimates were significantly greater than the true duration for all
three conditions (all ps ,.001). Table 1 also shows the subjective
impression judgments which, like the duration estimates, were
unaffected by temporal structure, F(2,132) = 2.09, p= .128,
g2p = .03. Levene’s test indicated that the variability of responses
did not differ between conditions for either the duration estimates
or the subjective impression judgments, F(2, 132) = 0.10, p= .907
and F(2, 132) = 0.27, p= .766, respectively.
Enjoyment. A supplementary analysis examined the effects of
condition on enjoyment. There was no effect, F(2,132) = .44,
p= .646, g2p = .01. (Caution may be needed here because there was
some heterogeneity of variance, F(2,132) = 3.21, p= .044).
Correlations between measures. We calculated the corre-
lations between enjoyment ratings, duration estimates and
subjective judgements to assess the size of any relationship
between these variables. The results showed a weak, significant
relationship between duration estimate and subjective judgement,
r = .20, p= .023. The other correlations were very small and not
significant which suggests extremely weak relationships between
duration estimates and enjoyment, r=2.11, p= .214, and between
subjective judgement and enjoyment, r=2.005, p= .955.
In short, this experiment found no effect of temporal structure
on retrospective judgments of music duration.
Experiment 1b
Experiment 1b was very similar to Experiment 1a, except that
participants knew in advance that they would be asked how long
the music lasted. In addition, the participant sample was rather
different.
Method
Participants. One hundred and thirty five participants (66
female) aged 17–40 years (M=21.3 years, SD=3.0 years) took
part. One additional participant reported crackling/loss of signal
from the headphones during testing and was replaced. (It is
possible that other participants experienced similar problems, but
none mentioned it.) Participants were primarily students at the
University of Essex, recruited during the term and tested at
convenient locations around campus such as in the university
library and lobbies (cf Experiment 1a, which used more
Table 1. Mean responses for Experiments 1a and 1b.
Duration Estimate Subjective Impression
Dec Con Acc Dec Con Acc
Expt 1a M 122.56 118.07 112.60 0.300 0.339 0.361
SD 40.31 39.80 38.69 0.146 0.140 0.146
Expt 1b M 89.42 93.33 80.18 0.390 0.358 0.333
SD 42.05 50.44 38.68 0.164 0.157 0.142
Duration estimates are in seconds. Dec =Decelerating; Con =Constant-tempo;
Acc = Accelerating.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059847.t001
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participants from outside the university and was conducted over
the summer vacation). The mean age of the participants is about
10 years younger than in the previous experiment.
Stimuli, design, and procedure. The experiment was very
similar to Experiment 1a, except that the initial instruction sheet
informed participants that they would be asked to judge how long
the music lasted, and told them not to use a watch because ‘‘we are
interested in your intuitive judgment of time’’. The response sheet
added a question asking participants ‘‘how you went about
estimating how long the piece of music lasted’’. A similar question
was asked at the end of Experiments 1c and 2, below. These
judgment-strategy data are not analyzed here, but are available
from the authors.
Results and Discussion
Recognition. Twenty participants (14.8%) reported recog-
nizing the music, distributed fairly evenly across decelerating
(N=10), constant-tempo (N=4), and accelerating (N=6) condi-
tions, x2(2, N= 135) = 3.29, p= .193, and between the pieces by
Bach (N=7), Ha¨ndel (N=5), and Mozart (N=8), x2(2,
N=135) = 0.82, p= .663. Only five participants made any attempt
to name the music; of these, one named the correct composer. As
before, the pieces were largely unrecognized, as intended.
Temporal judgments. The duration estimates for the
decelerating, constant-tempo, and accelerating conditions are
shown in Table 1, and did not differ, F(2,132) = 1.06, p= .349,
g2p = .02. The estimates were significantly longer than the true
duration in all conditions (all ps ,.001). Table 1 also shows the
subjective impression judgments, which were likewise unaffected
by condition, F(2,132) = 1.52, p= .223, g2p = .02. Levene’s test
indicated that the response variability did not differ between
conditions for either the duration estimates or the subjective
impression judgments, F(2, 132) = 0.56, p= .571 and F(2,
132) = 1.79, p= .171, respectively.
Enjoyment. The preliminary three-way ANOVA with con-
dition, composer, and recognition as between-subjects factors
indicated that the only significant factor affecting enjoyment was
recognition: participants who reported recognizing the piece also
reported greater enjoyment (M=5.25, SD=1.12) than those who
did not (M=4.01, SD=1.43), F(2,118) = 13.19, p,.001, g2p = .10.
No other main effects or interactions were significant (all ps ..14).
Correlations between measures. Duration estimates were
only weakly correlated with subjective impressions, and the
relationship missed significance: r= .167, p= .053. Neither type
of temporal judgment correlated with enjoyment (for duration
estimates: r= .04, p= .640; for subjective impressions: r=2.081,
p= .349).
In short, Experiment 1b found no effect of temporal structure
on one-off prospective judgments of music duration.
Experiment 1c
Neither the retrospective judgments of Experiment 1a nor the
prospective judgments of Experiment 1b were affected by changes
in tempo. However, inspection of the mean responses in Table 1
suggests two potentially interesting trends. Firstly, duration
estimates were much longer (and therefore less accurate) in the
retrospective task (overall mean= 117.7 seconds) than in the
prospective task (overall mean= 87.6 seconds). Secondly, in the
retrospective task the subjective-impression responses were great-
est for the accelerating stimuli and smallest for the decelerating
stimuli, whereas in the prospective task the order is reversed.
The results of Experiments 1a and 1b are not directly
comparable because participants were not randomly assigned to
tasks, and the participant groups were quite different in some
respects (e.g., age). Experiment 1c therefore combined prospective
and retrospective tasks in a single experiment, to test the reliability
of the cross-experiment differences suggested by Table 1. Because
the previous experiments indicated that the accelerating and
decelerating conditions are most different, we dropped the
constant-tempo condition to boost the power of the study.
Method
Participants. Two hundred and four participants aged 18–
51 (M=21.7, SD=4.6) took part; 67 were male. Five additional
participants were discarded because they indicated that they had
previously taken part in a music duration-judgment experiment.
Participants were members of the University of Essex participant
pool and were paid £3. Most booked test sessions through an on-
line system; some were recruited by the experimenter in person.
Stimuli, design, and procedure. As before, this experiment
used a fully between-subjects design. Participants were tested in a
quiet testing cubicle. The accelerating and decelerating versions of
the music from each composer were used equally often, half for
retrospective judgments and half for prospective judgments. The
experimenter cycled through the 12 cells of the design in sequence,
with the exception of the last 5 participants who were tested as
replacements for earlier participants. Instructions for the retro-
spective task were as in Experiment 1a; those for the prospective
task were the same as for Experiment 1b. The response sheets
were similar to before, except that the ‘‘enjoyment’’ question was
dropped. At the end, all participants were asked to write how they
formed their judgment.
Results and Discussion
Recognition. A total of 26 participants (12.7%) indicated that
they recognized the music; they were distributed fairly evenly over
accelerating (N=16) and decelerating (N= 10) conditions, x2(1,
N=204) = 1.59, p= .208, and between retrospective (N=11) and
prospective (N=15) tasks, x2 (1, N=204) = .71, p= .40; there was
some variation in the recognition of pieces by Bach (N=3), Ha¨ndel
(N=8), and Mozart (N=15), x2(2, N=204) = 9.61, p= .008].
Twelve people wrote something in the box asking them to name
the piece; three named the correct composer and one additional
person named the correct piece. As in the previous experiments, it
seems that the choice of stimuli achieved the goal of being largely
unrecognized.
Temporal estimates. The duration estimates are shown in
Table 2. A 262 ANOVA indicated no main effect of condition,
F(1,200) = 0.03, p= .866, g2p = .00 and no task6condition interac-
tion, F(1,200) = 0.57, p= .450, g2p = .00. Although retrospective
judgments tended to be longer than prospective judgments, the
effect missed significance, F(1,200) = 3.51, p= .063, g2p = .02. Mean
estimates were significantly above the true duration for all
conditions (all ps ,.001). Subjective impressions were similarly
unaffected by condition, task, and their interaction (all Fs ,1, ps
..3). Levene’s test showed that neither duration estimates nor
subjective impressions showed differences in variability across the
cells of the design, F(3, 200) = 1.70, p= .169 and F(3,200) = 1.15,
p= .331, respectively. As in the earlier experiments, magnitude
estimates and subjective judgments were weakly correlated, r= .21,
p= .003.
Experiment 1c therefore found no evidence for an overall effect
of changes in tempo on judgments of music duration and no
modulation by judgment task. Experiments 1a–1c used music to
define the to-be-judged interval. In addition to its emotive qualities
and familiarity, music typically has a highly coherent, hierarchical
Judgments of Duration
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 March 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 3 | e59847
structure [38], and may be judged different from other types of
stimuli/task [41]. The next two experiments generalized the
preceding findings to two other types of task, one of which
involved active responding (Experiment 2) and one which simply
involved processing text (Experiment 3).
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 examined the effects of changes in the pace of
events on the judged duration of a visuo-motor task.
Methods
Participants. A planned sample of 162 participants was
tested (115 female, ages 18–55 years, M=21.8 years, SD=5.1
years); two additional participants encountered technical difficul-
ties and had to be replaced. The participants were recruited from
the University of Essex participant pool, and were paid £3 each.
Design and Procedure. The experiment employed a 263
design with judgment task (prospective; retrospective) and
condition (constant rate; accelerating; decelerating) manipulated
between subjects. Due to a minor coding error, the numbers of
participants in the six cells of the design were not equal, but the
design was balanced for each factor separately. That is, half of the
participants were in the prospective task condition, half were in the
retrospective task condition, and one third of the participants were
assigned to each temporal structure (constant rate, accelerating,
and decelerating).
Participants signed a consent form providing relevant informa-
tion, including the maximum duration of the study (10 minutes).
The main task was computer-based and was performed in a
sound-attenuating chamber. Instructions were presented on-
screen, telling the participants that they should respond as quickly
as possible to arrows that appear on the screen. At this stage,
participants in the prospective condition were informed: ‘‘At the
end, we will ask you how long you spent doing the task’’;
participants in the retrospective condition were only told ‘‘At the
end, we will ask you some questions about the task’’.
Participants were told that they should press the ‘‘S’’ key if the
arrow pointed left and the ‘‘K’’ key if it pointed right, responding
as quickly as possible while maintaining accuracy. It was explained
that the arrows would keep appearing independently of the
participant’s responses, and that they should focus on the screen
throughout.
After the last page of instructions, the message ‘‘Get ready’’ was
displayed centrally on-screen for 2 seconds, followed by a 2 second
blank before the first stimulus. The task consisted of 91 black
arrows presented sequentially on a white background, pointing
either left or right with the direction randomly chosen on each
trial. Stimulus timing was measured in frames (screen refreshes);
the monitor had a refresh rate of 85 Hz (therefore one frame was
one 85th of a second) and a resolution of 10246780 pixels.
Stimulus presentation and response collection were controlled
using DMDX [42].
The arrows were displayed for 200 ms (15 frames) each,
followed by a blank screen. The duration of the blank screen
between the arrows depended on the condition. In the ‘‘constant
rate’’ condition, there was a 2153 ms (183 frames) blank between
stimuli. In the ‘‘accelerating’’ condition, the blank was 3212 ms
(273 frames) on the first trial and decreased by 23.5 ms (2 frames)
with each subsequent trial, reaching 1094 ms (93 frames) on the
final trial. In the ‘‘decelerating’’ condition, the blanks followed the
reverse pattern of the ‘‘accelerating’’ condition.
Following the final post-stimulus blank, the instructions ‘‘End of
Task. Wait a moment’’ were displayed for 1 second (3 participants
saw the ‘‘End of Task’’ message for slightly less than the usual 1
second because they pressed a response key when the message was
on the screen). The end-of-task message was followed by
instructions to estimate task duration (defined as the time from
the ‘‘Get Ready’’ message at the start until the ‘‘End of Task’’
message at the end), in minutes and seconds. Participants were told
to make intuitive judgements without referring to a watch or clock.
A second question requested participants to mention the strategy
used to come up with the time estimate. Both responses were made
on a paper response sheet.
Results and Discussion
The actual times between the appearance of the ‘‘Get Ready’’
signal and the appearance of the ‘‘End of Task’’ signal were
measured by the computers’ internal clocks. Across all partici-
pants, the mean was 215.98 seconds (SD=0.01 seconds); there was
minor variation because of occasional dropped frames etc, but
across all participants the shortest and longest durations differed
by only 66 ms. Accuracy on the visuo-motor task was generally
high (M=94.1% correct, SD=9.3%). One participant scored well
below chance (2.1% correct), suggesting that they got the response
keys the wrong way round.
The data of primary interest were the duration estimates. Each
participant gave an estimate of the task duration, in minutes and
seconds, which was converted into seconds for analysis purposes.
In the few cases when participants reported approximations such
as ‘‘about 2–3 minutes’’, the average of the two values was
considered in the analysis, resulting in one score per participant.
The mean judgments are shown in Table 3.
A 263 fully between-subjects ANOVA was performed to see if
the duration estimates depended on task and/or temporal
structure. The results showed no main effect of task,
F(1,156) = 0.48, p= .488, g2p = .00, no main effect of condition,
F(2,156) = 0.60, p= .551, g2p = .01, and no interaction,
Table 2. Mean responses for Experiment 1c.
Duration Estimate Subjective Impression
Dec Acc Dec Acc
Retrospective M 110.25 116.16 .376 .414
SD 39.15 50.99 .169 .148
Prospective M 103.14 99.39 .394 .402
SD 46.36 44.93 .163 .180
Duration estimates are in seconds. Dec =Decelerating; Acc = Accelerating.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059847.t002
Table 3. Mean responses for Experiment 2.
Dec Con Acc
Retrospective M 252.25 219.69 231.67
SD 95.86 64.78 98.07
N 28 32 21
Prospective M 247.50 252.73 232.48
SD 93.29 105.53 74.12
N 26 22 33
Duration estimates are in seconds. Dec =Decelerating; Con =Constant-rate;
Acc = Accelerating.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059847.t003
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F(2,156) = 0.71, p = .492, g2p = .01. Levene’s test indicated that the
variance of the time estimates was not significantly different across
groups, F(5,156) = 0.97, p= .435. Mean duration judgments were
overestimates for all 6 task6condition combinations (all ps ..05,
but across all participants the overestimation was reliable,
t(161) = 3.28, p= .001).
Since the design of the study was not fully balanced (the cell
sizes were only equal for each of the factors taken separately), two
additional one-way between-subjects ANOVAs were performed,
one for each independent variable. There was no difference in
judgements between the accelerating, decelerating, and constant-
rate conditions, F(2,159) = 0.71, p= .494, g2p = .01. The non-
significant effect of task was also replicated, F(1,160) = 0.41,
p= .524, g2p = .00.
In short, there was no difference between the three temporal
structure conditions. Moreover, time estimates were not signifi-
cantly different between participants who were informed they
would have to make a duration judgement and those who were
not, and the effects of temporal structure were not dependent on
whether the participants knew they will be required to make such a
judgement.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 examined the effects of temporal structure on the
judged duration of a reading task, and focused on retrospective
judgments.
Method
Participants. A total of 134 native speakers of English (86
females) participated in this experiment. Their mean age was 21.5
years (SD=5.7 years), ranging from 18 to 55 years.
Design and Procedure. The stimuli consisted of 16 ‘‘facts’’
taken from www.snopes.com (e.g., ‘‘The youngest mother on
record was a five-year-old Peruvian girl’’), presented in black font
on a white background on a CRT monitor (128061024 pixels
refreshing at 85 Hz). The stimulus presentation was controlled by
PsychoPy [43].Participants were tested individually in sound-
attenuating cubicles, and were randomly assigned to one of three
conditions (constant, accelerating, or decelerating rate). Partici-
pants were told that they would be shown a list of ‘‘fun facts’’, one
at a time, that they should read each one while it was on the
screen, and that they would be asked some questions about what
they had read at the end. They were not informed that a duration
estimate would be required.
In the constant-rate condition, the facts were presented for 5
seconds each (425 frames); in the decelerating condition, the first
fact was presented for 2 seconds (170 frames), and each subsequent
fact was presented for 400 ms (34 frames) longer than the previous,
up to 8 seconds (680 frames) for the last one; the accelerating
condition was the mirror image of the accelerating condition (e.g.,
the first fact was presented for 8 seconds, and each subsequent fact
was shown for 400 ms shorter than the previous one). In all
conditions, the total duration was the same (M=81.6 seconds,
SD=0.03, ranging from 81.49 to 81.63 seconds). (Note that the
actual time varied very slightly between participants because the
duration of one display frame is not always precisely 1/85th of a
second.).
The 16 facts were presented in the same order for all
participants. Following the presentation of the facts, the partici-
pants were asked to judge (without using a watch) the time
duration (in seconds) between the appearance of the first fact and
the disappearance of the last one. They were further told that the
answer lies somewhere between 0 and 180 seconds.
Results and Discussion
The response from one participant who reported having
misunderstood the task was excluded. The mean time judgment
was 83.00 seconds (SD=40.18) in the constant-rate condition
(N=43), 84.98 seconds (SD=39.46) in the accelerating condition
(N=45), and 81.97 seconds (SD=44.19) in the decelerating
condition (N= 45). A one-way between subjects ANOVA revealed
no reliable difference in time judgement between the three
conditions, F(2,130) = 0.06, p= .940, g2p .00, and Levene’s test
indicated no heterogeneity of response variance, F(2,130) = 0.10,
p= .901. Mean duration estimates did not differ from the true
event duration (for all three conditions, and collapsing over
condition, ps ..5).
A secondary analysis was conducted excluding 12 participants
who reported unusually low judgments of less than 20 seconds
(suggesting that they may have misunderstood the instructions).
Excluding these from the analysis did not change the effect of
condition, F ,1.
In short, this experiment again found no effect of changes in the
pace of events on retrospective judgments of time.
Conclusions
Across five studies, we found no significant effect of changes in
the pace of events on one-off judgments of duration. Table 4
summarizes the effect sizes for the duration estimates in the
current experiments (with the values calculated separately for the
prospective and retrospective conditions of Experiments 1c and 2).
The table shows both eta-squared and omega-squared values, with
the latter being regarded as a less biased estimate of the population
value [44]. Across all studies, the effect of temporal structure is
small. Table 4 also shows the effect sizes for the contrasts between
the decelerating, accelerating and (where applicable) constant-rate
conditions of each experiment. These estimates were submitted to
a random-effects meta-analysis using the metafor package for the
R statistical language [45,46]. None of the contrasts showed
significant heterogeneity in effect size (all ps ..60) and the overall
effect size estimates were 20.104 (95% confidence interval, CI:
20.307,0.100) for the accelerating-constant rate contrast; 0.089
(95% CI: 20.074, 0.253) for the decelerating-accelerating
contrast, and 0.057 (95% CI: 20.146, 0.259) for the decelerat-
ing-constant rate contrast. Note that all of the confidence intervals
are relatively narrow and span zero.
Our samples were large and our studies were highly-powered.
Previous comparisons of accelerating, decelerating, and constant-
rate stimuli found a median effect size of g2p = .53 for 5 studies
examining judgments of moving shapes [9] and g2p = .21 for 4
studies examining judgments of brief tone sequences [10] (the
latter paper also reports additional experiments with similar effect
sizes in its Supplementary materials). The power to detect such
effects is more than 99.9% for every experiment reported here
[47]. Even the smallest of the effects in the aforementioned papers
was g2p = .10, and the power to detect such an effect was 93.9%,
93.9%, 99.7%, 97.2%, and 93.7% for Experiments 1a-3,
respectively. We also computed Bayes factors [48–51] for the
duration estimates using a Zellner-Siow g prior [52] proposed as a
default for ANOVA-type designs [53,54]. These Bayes factors
were computed using a modified version of the code provided by
Wetzels and colleagues [53] and are shown in Table 5; in every
case, the data favour the null hypothesis by at least 10 to 1.
We must be cautious about generalizing these null results. Other
stimuli and tasks might show a different pattern. Moreover,
although the changes in tempo that we used were clearly
noticeable, stronger manipulations might produce a significant
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effect. Our goal in reporting the current experiments is to provide
a first investigation of how changes in the pace of external events
influence one-off estimates of duration, and our results will be a
useful contribution to subsequent meta-analyses of this issue.
If future work confirms our findings, then the null effect of
changes in tempo will help constrain theoretical accounts of
duration judgment. There are many accounts of temporal
judgment, and it seems premature to engage in a lengthy
discussion of all of them at this point. Rather, we briefly outline
a few basic ideas. Considering first retrospective judgments, we
noted above that many accounts have posited that remembered
duration is positively related to the ‘‘storage size’’ [19], degree of
segmentation [20,21], or number of contextual changes [22]
during the to-be-recalled interval (see also [1] for a change-based
account of active timing). The null effects reported here suggest
that, if these accounts are correct, then tempo changes do not add
complexity or require more changes in processing than constant-
rate event sequences. That is, the complexity/degree of segmen-
tation/amount of change that determines a remembered duration
seems to be defined in terms of first order change (the mean rate of
events during the interval), not second order change (changes in
the rate of events during the interval). Likewise, we found no
indication that changes in tempo disrupt the coherence of the
stimulus/event sequence in such a way as to impair duration
estimates relative to constant-tempo stimuli.
Turning to prospective judgments, we noted in the Introduction
that many theorists assume intentional timing to be based on
counting or accumulating the output of a pacemaker whose rate
may be linked to the rate of external stimulation. The null effects
found here suggest either that the pacemaker rate is unaffected by
external tempo, or that any coupling is linear (such that subjective
duration depends only on the total number of external events in a
given time period). Likewise, under the change-based account of
Beckmann and Young [1], the current data argue that it is first-
order change, not second-order change, which determines judged
duration.
Our experiments found no significant differences between
prospective and retrospective judgments. This stands in contrast
to the more usual finding of longer and more accurate judgments
in the prospective paradigm (e.g., [13,55]). The reason for this
difference is not clear. Possibly our forewarning was not a strong
enough manipulation; instructions which more forcefully empha-
sized the need for an accurate temporal judgment in the
prospective condition might have produced different results. In
any case, our data will again make a useful contribution to meta-
analyses of this effect [56].
Although we found no effect of temporal structure, studies using
brief, meaningless stimuli which participants judge many times in
a within-subject experiment show large effects (e.g., [6,9]). Why
the difference? One explanation is that psychophysical studies
reduce noise, maximizing experimental effects (although it is
perhaps unlikely that the current studies would not even find a
consistent trend, especially given the large sample sizes). Low-
noise, psychophysical studies help illuminate basic aspects of
perception, but the results are much less relevant to one-off
judgments of moderate durations of the kind that people typically
make outside the laboratory. Furthermore, presenting many
similar items for judgment within an experimental session
provokes inter-item comparisons and perceptual contrast which
can strongly influence judgment [15–17,57–59]. An alternative
(not contradictory) possibility is that timing mechanisms are
different for durations of a few seconds and for intervals of a few
minutes. In particular, longer durations and more complex,
naturalistic stimuli permit a greater diversity of judgment strategies
than brief, impoverished items. Exploring these disparate strategies
will be a key direction for future research. Relatedly, it will be
important to establish whether factors such as modality [32,33],
intensity [31], and repetition/familiarity [60–63], which exert a
profound influence on psychophysical studies of perceived
duration, have a noticeable impact on one-off judgments of
naturalistic stimuli.
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Table 4. Effect sizes for all studies.
g2p v
2
Acc -
Con
Dec -
Acc
Dec -
Con
Expt 1a Retrospective 0.011 0.000 20.138 0.250 0.111
Expt 1b Prospective 0.016 0.001 20.290 0.227 20.084
Expt 1c Retrospective 0.004 0.000 n/a 20.129 n/a
Expt 1c Prospective 0.002 0.000 n/a 0.081 n/a
Expt 2 Retrospective 0.010 0.000 0.148 0.209 0.398
Expt 2 Prospective 0.027 0.002 20.227 0.178 20.052
Expt 3 Retrospective 0.001 0.000 0.049 20.071 20.024
The g2p and v
2columns show the effect sizes for the effect of temporal structure
on duration estimate in each experiment/condition. The effects for the
prospective and retrospective judgment data from Experiments 1c and 2 have
been analyzed separately, so each analysis is based on a one-way design and
the partial eta-squared values shown here are identical to eta-squared. Note
also that the calculation of omega-squared assumes a balanced design, but
there were slightly unequal cell-sizes in Experiment 3. The last 3 columns show
the standardized differences between means g* [64] calculated using the
metafor package for R [46]. Acc = accelerating, Dec =Decelerating;
Con=Constant-rate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059847.t004
Table 5. Bayes factors for the duration estimates of
Experiments 1a-3.
Experiment Bayes Factor
1a 68.2
1b 48.5
1c – Retrospective Judgments 10.3
1c – Prospective Judgments 11.7
2– Retrospective Judgments 28.9
2– Prospective Judgments 57.2
3 127.9
The Bayes factor is the probability of the observed data under the null
hypothesis divided by the probability of the data under the distribution of
alternative hypotheses specified by the Zellner-Siow g prior. Values greater than
1 indicate support for the null hypothesis that there is no effect of temporal
structure on duration estimates. Values greater than 10 are often labelled
‘‘strong’’ evidence for the null; values greater than 30 are ‘‘very strong’’
evidence [48].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059847.t005
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